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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
00O00

BARBARA J. MOTES,

:

Plaintiff/Appellant/
Petitioner,

:
:

v.

:

PRESTON J. MOTES,

: Case No. 8800315-CA
: District Court No. D86-1615

Defendant/Respondent/
Cross Appellant

: Priority No. 14(b)
00O00

APPELLANTS PETITION FOR REHEARING

The Appellant/Petitioner,

Barbara

J.

Motes, through her

counsel on appeal Kent M. Kasting, Esq., of Dart, Adamson &
Kasting, petitions this Court pursuant to Riile 3 5 of the Rules of
the Utah Court of Appeals for a rehearing of the issues raised by
Appellant on appeal based upon the reasons set forth below.
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT AND CERTIFICATION
This petition is based on the fact that this Court's opinion
in the above matter overlooks and misapprehends several points of
law and fact germane to the issues originally raised on appeal.
Counsel for Appellant/Petitioner hereby certifies that this
Petition is brought in good faith and not for delay.

POINT I
THIS COURT MISUNDERSTOOD HOW THE TRIAL COURT
DEALT WITH MRS. MOTES1 INHERITANCE AND ITS
DICTA RELATIVE TO ITS REMAND SHOULD BE VACATED
At the time of trial, most of Mrs. Motes' inheritance had been
transferred by the parties to the parties' children in accounts set
up specifically for the children (Tr. 38, 42 & 69).

Mr. Motes

claimed he was entitled to all of the appreciation on all of the
inheritance.

(Tr. 69 and Defendant's Exhibit 1.)

In arriving at the overall property distribution, the trial
court isolated and did not include in it either of the parties'
retirement.

Rather, it took the remaining property and awarded

Mrs. Motes $87,707 in value and Mr. Motes $99,913 in value and then
explained that the $12,206 difference in favor of Mr. Motes was to
compensate him for his claim that his efforts increased the value
of Mrs. Motes' inheritance (most of which had already been given
to the children) .
Nowhere in the findings or record is there a suggestion that
the deferral of the retirement funds distribution was related to
and based upon the overall property distribution.

Therefore, the

dicta contained in the last paragraph of page 4 of the Motes
opinion and the further comments contained in footnote 3 reflect
a misunderstanding

of the facts by this Court

and give the

implication that an entire new trial is necessary on all of the
property issues vis a vis Mr. Motes' entitlement to compensation
for his alleged "investment services" when it is clear from the
record that the trial court considered those services.
2

The remedy

fashioned by the trial court related to the

property division was not "inextricably
court's

deferral

retirement plans.

of

a

decision

on

the

linked" to the trial
distribution

of the

At best, the retirement income deferral issue

was related to the trial court's award of child support and a
remand of this case should not, even by inference, suggest an
entire new trial on all property and support issues.

Rather, the

remand should be for the purposes of determining what child support
Mr. Motes should have been paying, after considering his actual
income and his imputed income based upon a full utilization of his
skills and talents and a determination of what he would then owe
Mrs. Motes for using all of the retirement income while this appeal
has been pending.
The mere passage of substantial amounts of time between the
trial court's distribution of property and this Court's decision
makes

the

suggestion

that new trial

be held

on all

issues

impossible, as a practical matter, given changes in financial
positions of the parties, and fluctuations in asset values which
have occurred since trial.
The original property distribution was clearly within the
discretion of the trial court.

Simply because it did not include

two assets of the marriage (capable of now being separately divided
very easily) should not be the basis of an entire new trial as now
has been suggested in the opinion.
This Court's opinion should be modified with instructions to
the trial court to divide the pension plans consistent with this
3

Court's holding in Greene v. Greene. 751 P. 2d 827, 830-31 (Utah
App. 1988), and to then fix an appropriate award of child support
based upon the parties' respective earnings and capacities to earn.
POINT II
THIS COURT "S DECISION ON THE INCOME TAX
EXEMPTION ISSUE IS INCONSISTENT WITH THE
DECISIONS OF MARTINEZ V, MARTINEZ. 754 P. 2d 69
(Utah App. 1988) cert, granted 765 P.2d 1277
(Utah 1988) and FULMER V. FUIMER, 761 P. 2d 942
(Utah App. 1988) AND AS SUCH CREATES CONFUSION
AND UNCERTAINTY FOR TRIAL COURTS AND LITIGANTS
While the parties did not consider the income tax exemption
issue to be two major issues related to this appeal, this Court
evidently felt otherwise and has now concluded that trial courts
in Utah have the discretion to allocate income tax exemptions in
divorce actions. In so doing, this Court erroneously attempted to
distinguish the Motes case from this Court's previous decisions in
Martinez v. Martinez. 754 P. 2d 69 (Utah App. 1988) cert, granted
765 P.2d 1277 (Utah 1988) and Fulmer v. Fulmer, 761 P.2d 942 (Utah
App. 1988) . Those cases are not distinguishable and are directly
contrary to the Court's holding in Motes.
In Martinez, the trial court specifically found and ordered
the following:
24. As
a
result
of
the
substantial
contribution by Defendant to the support and
maintenance of the parties' children, it is
fair and equitable that Defendant be awarded
the two oldest children for tax deduction
purposes, and that Plaintiff be directed to
file the necessary documents in order to allow
Defendant to claim them as deductions during
each December starting 1985. Plaintiff should
be awarded the deductions for the youngest
child (R. 208-209).
4

Mrs. Martinez then appealed that portion of the order claiming
that federal law awarding the custodial parent the tax exemptions
in the absence of a waiver preempted the state court's power to
allocate exemptions.
The undersigned, as counsel on appeal for Dr. Martinez,
responded
discretion

and

argued that

to allocate

the

a Utah

trial

exemptions.

court did have the
The portion

of Dr.

Martinez's brief dealing with that and considered by this Court is
set forth below verbatim;
POINT IV
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN ALLOCATING THE
INCOME TAX EXEMPTIONS AS IT DID.
A.
SECTION 30-3-5, UTAH CODE ANN. (1953) , GIVE THE
TRIAL COURT THE POWER TO ALLOCATE INCOME TAX
EXEMPTIONS IN ANY MANNER THAT IS FAIR AND
EQUITABLE IN A DIVORCE ACTION.
Appellant, in Point IV of her Brief,
argues that because of a recent change in the
federal tax laws, state courts no longer have
the power or right to allocate dependency
exemptions in divorce actions. Appellant's
argument that the Internal Revenue Code now
preempts the ability of a state court to
control this important property right of the
parties, present in every divorce case, whether
contested or uncontested, provides a simple but
an incorrect analysis of the law.
First,
the
Internal
Revenue
Code
provisions are silent as to whether a state
court has or does not have the power to
allocate the exemptions. In the absence of a
specific statutory prohibition, principles of
statutory construction require that prohibited
functions cannot be inferred from the general
language of the statute.
If there is no
specific prohibition, then the function is
allowable and not in violation of the statute.
5

See, 73 Am.Jur.2d Statutes Section 210. The
new tax law makes no mention of a prohibition
of a state court from allocating exemptions.
Second, Appellant's argument, if accepted,
would
give
every
custodial
parent
an
"inalienable" right to claim the exemptions
unless he or she voluntarily gave them to the
non-custodial parent. It would insulate the
custodial parent from any judicial review of
the equitable effect of having or not having
the exemptions. Certainly, that was not the
intent of Congress in passing the 1984
Amendments.
A better explanation of those
changes is that they were intended to apply in
cases where the parties voluntarily agree that
the non-custodial parent may claim the
exemptions, or where the non-custodial parent
does not care to be awarded the exemptions.
However, in divorce cases where the award
of dependency exemption is a contested issue,
it becomes the job of the state courts to award
those exemptions on an equitable basis after
considering the income and tax rates of the
parties, the amount of support to be paid, and
the financial impact of any such award on both
of the parties.
The authority of the Utah courts to deal
with income tax exemptions is found in Section
30-3-5, Utah Code Ann. (1953 as amended) , which
provides in relevant part:
(1) When a decree of divorce is
rendered, the court may include in
it equitable orders relating to the
children, property and parties. Id.
(Emphasis added.)
This statute allows income tax exemptions to
be dealt with by the divorce court in at least
three ways. First, because an exemption can
be worth over $600.00 to a taxpayer in the 50%
bracket, it becomes an important property right
which is integrally related to any child
support award. Second, because it may have an
effect on the child support award, it
indirectly affects the children and the monies
they receive. Third, the court may make orders
relative to the parties and direct them to do
or refrain from doing certain things, including
6

the execution of documents to achieve an
equitable resolution of the issues in a divorce
action.
In this case, the court made the following
Finding of Fact on the exemption issue.
24.
As a result of the
substantial contribution by Defendant
to the support and maintenance of the
parties1 children, it is fair and
equitable that Defendant be awarded
the two oldest children for tax
deduction
purposes,
and
that
Plaintiff be directed to file the
necessary documents in order to allow
Defendant to claim them as deductions
during each December starting 1985.
Plaintiff should be awarded the
deductions for the youngest child.
(R. 208-209)
As can be seen, the court considered the
amount of support the Defendant was to pay in
reaching what is considered to be an equitable
allocation of the exemptions and ""it then
directed the Plaintiff to execute the documents
necessary
to
effectuate
this
equitable
allocation. The federal statutes in no way
prohibit the court from doing what it did. To
do so would necessarily result in substantial
and serious inequities in divorce actions
throughout the country.
Even assuming that the federal statutes
could be read in such a away as to preclude a
state court from allocating exemptions in
divorce actions per se, they certainly cannot
be read to also preclude the court from
ordering a party to allow the non-custodial
parent to claim the exemption.
This is an
inherent power of the divorce court absolutely
necessary to achieve a full, complete and fair
resolution of the financial issues always
involved in divorce actions where qhildren are
involved.
Because the 1984 amendment to Section
152(e) did not eliminate the ability of the
state court to allocate the dependency
deduction, the trial court did not abuse its
discretion or violate the supremacy clause of
7

the U.S. Constitution in awarding the Defendant
two of the three children for purposes of
federal
and
state
tax
deductions.
(Respondent's
Brief p. 42-45
Martinez v.
Martinez, supra).
The above argument was rejected by the Martinez court and
certiorari on that particular issue was then refused by the Utah
Supreme Court.
Martinez holds there is no power to allocate exemptions and
Motes now holds that there is that power and in so doing places the
writer of this Brief in the unenviable position of being able to
say he argued in Martinez that the power to allocate exemptions
existed and lost and later argued in Motes that the power to
allocate exemptions did not exist and lost.
Likewise, in Motes, this Court has now concluded the trial
court has the discretion to allocate exemptions whereas in Fulmer
v. Fulmer, 751 P.2d 942 (Utah App. 1988), Judge Billings writing
for herself and Judges Greenwood and Garff stated:
Our decision today maintains appellant as
Dagin's custodial parent. Appellant has not
signed a written waiver allowing respondent to
claim the exemption.
Thus under Section
152(e), appellant, as the custodial parent, is
entitled to the exemption.
Although many state courts interpreting the
predecessor provisions to section 152(e) have
determined that they have discretion to award
the exemption in a divorce proceeding, see
generally, Davis v. Fair, 707 S.W.2d 711, 717
(Tex. Ct. App. 198 6) (and cases cited therein) ,
we agree with the courts that have concluded
they do not have the authority to grant the
exemption contrary to the provisions of the
Internal Revenue Code. Id. at 718. See also
Lorenz v. Lorenz, 166 Mich. App. 58, 419 N.W.2d
770 (Mich. App. 1988); Valento v. Valento, 385
N.W.2d 860 (Minn.App. 1986). Accordingly, we
8

reverse the trial court's
exemption to respondent.

award

of

the

Id. at 950 (Emphasis added.)
From the foregoing, it is clearly apparent that this Court's
holding in Motes is directly contrary to the holdings of Martinez
and Fulmer. The principles of stare decisis how require this Court
to reverse its decision in Motes on the tax exemption issue or in
the alternative, the overrule its decisions in Martinez and Fulmer.
Parenthetically, it is also important to note that Section
78-45-2 et seq., Utah Code Ann, dealing with Uniform Child Support
Guidelines was evidently based on calculations which included
granting the exemptions to the custodial parent in determining
support awards under the guidelines and, therefore, this Court's
holding in Motes, necessarily makes the fixed child support amounts
under the guidelines subject to challenge and invalidation.
To ignore this inconsistency creates uncertainty and confusion
for trial courts and litigants alike and results in a total absence
of guidance as to what the state of the law is relative to
allocation of tax exemptions in divorce actions.
POINT III
THIS COURT'S DECISION NOT TO AWARD MRS. MOTES
HER ATTORNEY'S FEES ON APPEAL EFFECTIVELY
PRECLUDES HER FROM FURTHER LITIGATION OF HER
CASE.
Even though Mrs. Motes' request for attorney's fees on appeal
was thoroughly briefed and supported by valid authority, this Court
summarily addressed that issue by stating:
The parties shall bear their own costs and
attorney's fees on appeal (Motes v. Motes, Case
9

No. 880015-CA, filed November 16, 1989).
Mrs. Motes does not have the financial resources to pay the
attorneyfs fees she incurred in connection with securing a reversal
of Judge Rigtrup's decision related to the handling of the parties1
respective retirement funds. She is substantially indebted to her
appellate counsel and by no means has the resources to pursue what
amounts to a new trial on the property issues at the district court
level.
Mrs. Motes was the successful party on appeal.

She was

required to bring the error of the trial court to this Court's
attention and consequently should be awarded the fees which she
incurred on the original appeal as well as the fees she has now
incurred

in connection with the filing of this Petition for

Rehearing.
This Court has always been willing to award a spouse fees on
appeal when that spouse is required to defend an appeal which is
found to be without merit.
162 (Utah App. 1989)).

(See Mauqhn v. Maughn, 770 P.2d 156,

Likewise, where a spouse is required to

appeal an action of the trial court which is clearly erroneous and
then secures a reversal an award of attorney's fees on appeal is
also appropriate (See Rasband v. Rasband, 752 P. 2d 1331, 1337 (Utah
App. 1987)).
Fees on appeal should be awarded Mrs. Motes and the matter
remanded for a factual determination of her need and the amount of
fees she incurred on appeal consistent with the procedure set out
in Rasband supra.
10

CONCLUSION
The original property distribution was clearly within the
discretion of the trial court and considered any efforts Mr. Motes
claimed

to

have

expended

in

connection

attributable to Mrs. Motes1 inheritance.
the

trial

inextricably

court

related

linked

to

to
the

the
trial

with

appreciation

The remedy fashioned by

property
court's

division
decision

was

not

on

the

distribution of the retirement plans. As such this Court's opinion
should be modified with instructions to the trial court to divide
the pension plans consistent with the holdibg in Greene, supra.,
and to then fix an appropriate award of child support based on the
parties' respective earnings and capacities to earn.
This Court's decision on the income tax exemption issue is
inconsistent with the Martinez v. Martinez, supra., in Fulmer v.
Fulmer, supra. and as such, creates confusion and uncertainty for
trail courts and litigants. The principal of stare decisis require
this Court to reverse its decision in this case so as to be
consistent with the holdings of Martinez and Fulmer.
Mrs. Motes was the successful party on appeal.

She was

required to bring the error of the trial court to this Court's
attention and, consequently, should be awarded the fees which she
has incurred on the original appeal as well as the fees she has now
incurred

in connection with the filing of this Petition for

Rehearing.
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Respectfully submitted this 29th day of November, 1989.
DART, ADAMSON & KASTING

Cent Mo Kastii
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Aj
Petitioner

11ant/

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify I caused four true and correct copies of the
Petition for Rehearing to be hand-delivered to the following
counsel of record on the 29th day of November, 1989:
David S. Dolowitz
Cohen, Rapport & Segal
525 East 100 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
OOOOO
Barbara J. Motes,
6PINION
(For publication)

Plaintiff, Appellant, and
Cross-Respondent,
v.

Case fte.- 880015-CA
Preston J. Motes,

FILED

Defendant, Respondent, and
Cross-Appellant.

r^Uryh

Third District, Salt Lake County
The Honorable Kenneth Rigtrup
Attorneys:

Noe-'n

d!fc<^fth*
u*hcourts*

Kent M. Kasting, Salt Lake City, for Appellant
David S. Dolowitz and Julie A. Bryan, Salt Lake
City, for Respondent

Before Judges Billings, Greenwood, and Orra^.
ORME, Judge:
Plaintiff Barbara Motes appeals from the the trial court's
entry of a divorce decree, claiming the court erred in
postponing the apportionment of defendant Preston Motes's
military retirement fund.
Plaintiff also challenges the
court's power to order her to execute the forms necessary for
defendant to claim the federal tax dependency exemption for one
of their children whose custody was awarded to plaintiff.
This
issue is the primary focus of our opinion.
Defendant's
cross-appeal concerns the profits generated during the marriage
through his investment and management of plaintiff's
inheritance. We reverse in part, affirm in part, and remand
for further proceedings.

FACTS
Plaintiff and defendant were married in 1967. At that
time, defendant was three years into his career as a military
officer and plaintiff was a nurse. During the marriage,
defendant obtained a Masters of Business Administration degree
from the University of Utah, and plaintiff secured a Bachelor

of Science degree in nursing. At the time this action was
filed, defendant had retired from the military and was working
as a financial planner, and plaintiff was working as a nursing
supervisor and attempting to obtain her Master's degree in
nursing. Defendant claimed he suffered a net loss each month
from his financial planning work. Plaintiff earned a monthly
net income of approximately $1700.
At trial, the parties stipulated to the division of a large
part of the marital property, leaving disputes primarily as to
the division of defendant's military retirement benefits, which
were generating payments of approximately $1500 per month;
plaintiff's retirement fund, which held approximately $5100;
and plaintiff's substantial inheritance and the additional
funds generated through investment and growth of the
inheritance proceeds.
Following trial, at which plaintiff represented herself,
plaintiff was awarded custody of the children. The court
awarded defendant the right to receive the full amount of his
military retirement during the period in which he was to pay
child support. The court reasoned that, absent this income,
defendant would be unable to meet his child support
obligations, which the court had set based on defendant
receiving the full amount of his monthly retirement benefits.
The court determined that the final disposition of both
parties' retirement accounts would be settled when defendant's
child support obligations ceased, some five years hence.
Plaintiff was awarded the full amount of her inheritance and
the full amount of the investment income derived therefrom, and
defendant was awarded the federal tax dependency exemption for
one of the children.
On appeal, plaintiff argues that the court erred in
awarding defendant the full amount of his monthly military
retirement benefits, even though for the well-intentioned
purpose of enabling defendant to satisfy his child support
obligations. Plaintiff also contends the court exceeded its
authority in ordering her to execute the documents necessary
for defendant to claim the dependency exemption for one of the
children on his federal tax return. Defendant cross-appeals,
seeking a portion of those funds he claims to have generated by
prudently investing plaintiff's inheritance.1.
1. The record does not contain a satisfactory explanation as
to why defendant's claimed financial prowess enabled him to so
greatly enhance the value of plaintiff's inheritance while his
professional investment activities are so unsuccessful that his
expenses exceed his commissions.

880015-CA
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I.
RETIREMENT INCOME AND INVESTMENT PROCEEDS
FROM INHERITANCE
The interest in a retirement plan accrued during marriage
is considered a marital asset subject to equitable distribution
upon divorce. See, £^g.# Gardner v. Gardner. 748 P.2d 1076,
1078-79 (Utah 1988); Woodward v. Woodward, 656 P.2d 431, 432
(Utah 1982); Doau v. Poem. 652 P.2d 1308, 1310 (Utah 1982);
Greene v. Greene. 751 P.2d 827, 830-31 (Utah Ct. App. 1988);
Maxwell v. Maxwell. 754 P.2d 84, 86 (Utah Ct. App. 1988);
Bailev v. Bailev. 745 P.2d 830, 831 (Utah Ct. App. 1987);
Marchant v. Marchant. 743 P.2d 199, 204-05 (Utah Ct. App.
1987). The best method for distributing or allocating
retirement benefits or their value depends on the particular
circumstances, see Gardner. 748 P.2d at 1079, but where
possible the purpose to advance is that of "end[ing] marriage
and allow[ing] the parties to make as much of a clean break
from each other as is reasonably possible." III. Obviously,
postponing even a decision on ultimate distribution of both
retirement plans for some five years is inimical to that goal.
But see Ravburn v. Ravburn. 738 P.2d 238, 241-42 (Utah Ct. App.
1987) (cash-out of one spouse's interest in retirement fund
over five-year period was acceptable where total value of
retirement was substantial and installment cash-out approach
was only alternative to longer entanglement).2 Thus, as
between decreeing a more immediate adjustment or simply
deferring the other spouse-s participation until payments are
eventually received, our Supreme Court has stated that the
latter ••alternative should be employed only in rare
instances.H Gardner. 748 P.2d at 1079. Such instances include
cases "where other assets for equitable distribution are
inadequate or lacking altogether, or where no present value can
be established . . . . H I£. (quoting Kikkert v. Kikkert. 177
N.J. Super. 471, 478, 427 A.2d 76,. 79-80 (1981)).
However, unlike all but one of the cases cited in the
preceding paragraph, the instant case does not involve the
difficult questions presented by retirement programs held by
those still working, which will—or may—only eventually result
in income. In the instant case, like in Qreene. one spouse had
already retired and his retirement benefits had ripened into
monthly payments, see 751 P.2d at 828, the present value of
which could be readily ascertained. Treatment of such benefits
2. The Ravburn-type treatment was endorsed in Gardner.
748 P.2d at 1079.

880015-CA
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See

is less problematic than in the usual case. The present value
of plaintiffs share of the now-fixed stream of income, which
the benefits have become, can be readily calculated and
compensated for with distribution of other assets having an
equivalent value or cashed out over a comparatively short time.
That failing, provision can simply be made for plaintiff to
receive her share monthly, the approach taken in Greene. See
751 P.2d at 827.
Instead, the trial court in this case postponed the
distribution of defendant's retirement benefits for the purpose
of funding higher child support payments to plaintiff than would
otherwise have been appropriate. But the net effect of such an
approach is to fund defendant's support obligations through what
amounts to an appropriation of plaintiff's property. It is no
answer that the appropriation may be rescinded or ameliorated in
five years. The retirement plans of both parties should have
been treated as marital assets and definitively dealt with in
the decree as part of an equitable property distribution between
the parties. Accordingly, we reverse the court's treatment of
both parties' retirement funds and remand for distribution in
accordance with the foregoing.
The collateral effect of our reversing the trial court's
handling of the parties' retirement plans is that we must also
remand for reconsideration the child support award and the
disposition of proceeds generated through the investment of
plaintiff's inheritance. From all that appears, the court's
disposition of these items was inextricably linked with its
decision to deprive plaintiff of participation in defendant's
retirement fund for at least five years.3

3. We do not suggest that it would necessarily be inappropriate
to award defendant's share of the inheritance profits to
plaintiff in exchange for retirement benefits to which she would
otherwise be entitled. That may well be an element of an
equitable overall distribution. See, e.g., Gardner, 748 P.2d at
1079 (one "alternative would be reapportionment of the property
distribution to offset the value of the retirement account").
But the court's findings do not establish that this is what the
court did here, at least not with any precision. The general
question of defendant's entitlement to some part of the growth
of the inherited funds is governed by Mortensen v. Mortensen,
760 P.2d 304, 308 (Utah 1988).
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II.
FEDERAL TAX DEPENDENCY EXEMPTION
The most significant question this case presents is whether
a divorce court has the authority to award a tax exemption to
the noncustodial parent by ordering the custodial parent to
execute the necessary federal tax form. Two prior decisions of
this court, Fullmer v. Fullmer, 761 P.2d 942 (Utah Ct. App.
1988), and Martinez v. Martinez, 754 P.2d 69 (Utah Ct- App-),
cert, granted- 765 P.2d 1277 (Utah 1988), dealt generally with
the question of dependent tax exemptions in the divorce
context. However, neither involved an actual order that the
forms be executed. Sfifi Fullmer. 761 P.2d at 949-50; Martinez,
754 P.2d at 72- Thus, the precise issue is presented to us for
the first time in this case.
A. SECTION 152
Prior to the 1985 tax year, section 152 of the Internal
Revenue Code provided that a noncustodial parent was entitled to
claim a dependency exemption in any tax year where that parent
paid more than $1200 toward the child1s support, and the
custodial parent -did not clearly establish that [the custodial
parent] provided more support of such child - - - than the
parent not having custody." This rule apparently created
recurring headaches for the Internal Revenue Service. The usual
scenario began with a noncustodial parent who had paid more than
$1200 toward the child*s support, thus meeting the minimal
threshold requirement under section 152. However, the parents
were often in disagreement as to which of them had actually paid
the majority of the child's support. It was apparently not
uncommon for the dispute to be -resolved" by both parents
claiming an exemption for the child on their respective tax
returns. When this "double-dipping" was detected, the IRS was
forced to audit both parents' returns and otherwise investigate
to determine which one actually had paid the majority of the
child's support and was therefore entitled to the dependency
exemption. If nothing else, the situation amounted in an
inefficient expenditure of effort by the IRS.
In 1984, Congress accordingly amended section 152 to provide
that the custodial parent is automatically entitled to the
available dependency exemptions unless he or she "signs a
written declaration . . . that such custodial parent will not
claim such child as a dependant" and "the noncustodial parent
attaches such written declaration to [his or her tax]
return . . . ." 26 U.S.C. § 152(e)(2) (1988).
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The issue before us in this case is whether a state court
may order the custodial parent to execute the required
declaration allowing the noncustodial parent to claim the
exemptions. We hold that state courts do retain their
traditional authority to allocate dependency exemptions
notwithstanding the 1984 amendment. Our conclusion is based on
an analysis of Congress's intent in enacting the 1984 amendment;
the lack of a provision explicitly divesting state courts of
their consistently recognized pre-amendment authority to
allocate exemptions; the significant majority of other
jurisdictions holding that state courts retain such authority;
and the impracticality and irrationality of a contrary ruling.
B. CONGRESSIONAL INTENT
Prior to the 1984 amendment/ it was uniformly held that
state courts had authority to allocate dependency exemptions in
divorce cases.4 See, e.g.. Lincoln v. Lincoln, 155 Ariz. 272,
746 P.2d 13, 16-17 (Ct. App. 1987); Lorenz v. Lorenz, 166 Mich.
App. 58, 419 N.W.2d 770, 771 (1988); Fudenbero v. Molstad, 390
N.W.2d 19, 20 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986); Cross v. Cross, 363 S.E.2d
449, 456 (W. Va. 1987). Thus, the amendment would have to be
construed as a substantial departure from prior substantive law
for one to conclude that state courts do not still have this
power. This is an unreasonable construction of the amendment
for two reasons.
First, the amendment does not expressly divest state courts
of their traditional power, "and this silence demonstrates
Congress's surpassing indifference to how the exemption is
allocated as long as the IRS doesn't have to do the
allocating.- Cross, 363 S.E.2d at 457. Had Congress actually
intended to terminate the established practice of state courts
allocating exemptions, "it is more reasonable than not to infer
that . . . Congress would have said so." Icl. at 458. See also
In re Marriage of Einhorn, 178 111. App. 3d 212, 533 N.E.2d 29,
37 (1988); Wassif v. Wassif. 77 Md. App. 750, 551 A.2d 935, 940
(1989).
Second, Congress did not intend such a result. The 1984
amendment Hwas meant to address the desire of the IRS not to get
involved in [disputes between parents over exemptions] where it
4. The pre-amendment allocation was typically accomplished by
a court order providing that the noncustodial parent be
entitled to take the exemption if current in child support.
The "current in child support" proviso was incorporated into
the decree in this case as well, an entirely sensible condition.
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had very little, if anything, to gain by the outcome." Wassif,
551 A.2d at 939. The Congressional record supports that
characterization of the amendment.
The present rules governing the
allocations of the dependency exemption
are often subjective and present difficult
problems of proof and substantiation. The
Internal Revenue Service becomes involved
in many disputes between parents who both
claim the dependency exemption based on
providing support over the applicable
thresholds. The cost to the parties and
the Government to resolve these disputes
is relatively high and the Government
generally has little tax revenue at stake
in the outcome. The committee wishes to
provide more certainty by allowing the
custodial spouse the exemption unless that
spouse waives his or her right to claim
the exemption. Thus, dependency disputes
between parents will be resolved without
the involvement of the Internal Revenue
Service.
H.R. Rep. No. 432, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. II, reprinted in
1984 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 697, 1140. Following the
amendment, all the IRS need concern itself with when facing a
noncustodial parent claiming an exemption is whether the
custodial parent has executed the requisite declaration. See
Einhorn, 533 N.E.2d at 37. The administrative ease of such a
procedure is obvious, but it should be of no concern to the IRS
if the declaration was executed entirely voluntarily, in
accordance with a stipulated settlement, or pursuant to court
order. The IRS is merely interested in the orderly
administration of revenue collections, which is enhanced by
doing away with the -majority of support" test. That test
necessitated extensive audits by the IRS, while compliance with
the signed declaration requirement can be ascertained most
expediently. We arc net cited to, nor have we located, any
authority indicating that Congress intended the 1984 amendment
to divest state courts of their traditional authority and
bestow a collateral economic benefit on custodial parents. Nor
can we identify any legitimate policy reason for Congress to
assert an interest in the division of what is tantamount to
marital property, a task traditionally reserved under our
federal system for each state's domestic relations courts.
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In sum, the amendment was merely intended to enhance the
administrative convenience of the IRS, not to interfere with
state court prerogatives.5 See, e.g., Fudenberg v. Molstad.
390 N.W.2d 19, 21 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986); In re Marriage of
Milesnick, 765 P.2d 751, 754 (Mont. 1988); Peroolski v.
Pergolski, 143 Wise. 2d 166, 420 N.W.2d 414, 417 (Ct. App.
1988).
C. CASE AUTHORITY
The vast majority of other jurisdictions to confront the
issue have concluded that state courts retain the authority to
order the custodial parent to execute the declaration
contemplated by the 1984 amendment. 15 Fam. L. Rep. (BNA) 1335
(May 16, 1989); In re Marriage of Milesnick, 765 P.2d at 754.
See Lincoln v. Lincoln, 155 Ariz. 272, 746 P.2d 13, 16-17 (Ct.
App. 1987); In re Marriage of Einhorn, 178 111. App. 3d 212,
533 NeE.2d 29, 35-37 (1988):6 In re Marriage of Lovetinskv,
418 N.W.2d 88, 90 (Iowa Ct. App. 1987); Wassif v. Wassif, 77
Md. App. 750, 551 A.2d 935, 939-40 (1989); Fudenberg v.
Molstad, 390 N.W.2d 19, 21 (Minn. App. 1986); McKenzie v.
Jahnke, 432 N.W.2d 556, 557 (N.D. 1988); Hughes v. Hughes, 35
Ohio St. 3d 165, 518 N.E.2d 1213, 1214-16, cert, denied, 109 S.
Ct. 124 (1988); Cross v. Cross, 363 S.E.2d 449, 456-60 (W. Va.
1987); Pergolski, 420 N.W.2d at 417. See also Jensen v.
Jensen, 753 P.2d 342, 345 (Nev. 1988) (per curiam) (a custodial
5. It is noteworthy that Congress, motivated by a desire to
minimize administrative problems for the IRS, tailored its
amendment to reflect a presumption that in the typical case,
the custodial parent will indeed be the one providing most
support. If it assumed the routine situation would be
otherwise, Congress would have provided that the noncustodial
parent would be entitled to the exemptions absent a declaration
from the custodial parent.
6. It appears that two divisions of the Illinois Court of
Appeals have split on this issue. See In re Marriage of Emerv,
179 111. App. 3d 744, 534 N.E.2d 1014, 1018 (1989). The
analysis in Einhorn is much more compelling. Einhorn carefully
analyzes both sides of the issue. Emery, on the other hand,
disposes of the issue in one conclusory paragraph, without even
acknowledging the previously decided Einhorn opinion or the
weight of authority to the contrary. Additionally, it is not
clear that the trial court in Emerv had actually ordered the
custodial parent to execute the necessary declaration. See 534
N.E.2d at 1018.
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parent can be ordered to execute a "waiver" of dependency
exemption, but only if a similar result cannot be achieved by
adjusting alimony and child support to achieve after-tax
financial parity).
We find Hughes, 518 N.E.2d at 1214-17, to be particularly
compelling. In Hughes, the sole issue on appeal was identical
to the major issue before us here. The majority considered at
length the purpose for the 1984 amendment and concluded it was
made for the administrative convenience of
the Internal Revenue Service. A domestic
relations court has broad discretion to
determine the proper mix and allocation of
marital assets and property rights in a
divorce proceeding . . . . We find
nothing in the legislative history of the
[1984 amendment] to support [the] theory
that new Section 152 was meant to encroach
upon this exclusive statutory power of
state courts. . . . The only concern of
the IRS, evident from the history
surrounding the changes, is that only one
divorced spouse claim and receive the
deduction.
i

Id. at 1215-16. In contrast, the Hughes dissenters argued that
section 152 requires a voluntary waiver by the custodial
parent, not one compelled by court order. J^L. at 1217 (Wright,
J., dissenting). Although one can only infer the basis for the
Supreme Court's denial of certiorari, 109 S. Ct. 124 (1988), it
may be significant that section 152 is not couched in terms of
a Hwaiver,M but only of a "declaration."7

7. There are at least three reasons for the Supreme Court to
have granted certiorari in Hughes if it felt the case was
wrongly decided. First, the case exclusively involves the
interpretation of federal law; second, a few state courts have
adopted a different interpretation, one consistent with that
espoused by the dissenters in Hughes, thus creating a split in
authority; and third, the issue involves substantial policy
questions and implicates the division of power under our
federal scheme.
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must consider which parent will receive this benefit in setting
child support and alimony. At least three courts have even
gone so far as to remand cases where the exemption was held on
appeal to have been improperly awarded to the noncustodial
parent# recommending that the trial court reduce the previously
awarded child support and alimony in light of the noncustodial
parent's loss of this financial benefit* See Lorenz, 419
N.E.2d at 772; Sarver, 439 P.2d at 552; Davis, 707 S.W.2d at
718. This result/ while unavoidable under the minority view,
is bizarre, with dependent children the ultimate victims. As
pointed out quite convincingly in £££££# 363 S.E.2d at 458-59/
the minority view forces state courts to achieve financial
parity indirectly/ by downwardly adjusting otherwise
appropriate alimony and child support/ rather than achieving
parity directly# by sensibly allocating the exemptions.
Second, these cases are lacking in thoughtful or
disciplined analysis. For example/ the Florida Court of
Appeals rejects Cross and its progeny because "deductions and
exemptions . . . are not to be extended beyond the clear import
of the language used." McKenzie, 532 So*2d at 100 n.3.
However# as pointed out above/ section 152 merely grants the
noncustodial parent the right to an exemption if he or she
secures a declaration from the custodial parent. Section 152
is absolutely silent as to whether or not state courts may
direct the custodial parent to execute the declaration as part
of its overall disposition. Thus# the McKenzie court offends
the very theory it purports to uphold by imposing prohibitions
on state courts which are not expressly or impliedly imposed by
section 152.
Similarly/ in Gleason, 728 P.2d at 967/ the Oregon Court of
Appeals concludes/ without analysis, that w[i]n the
circumstances here/ the court should not have designated which
party would receive the dependency exemption.- Gleason
obviously ignores the rationale of the more recent cases
rejecting its conclusion, and in this light, its one-sentence,
conclusory holding is not very compelling. Finally, we find
Justice Neelyfs criticism of Davis, 707 S.W.2d 711, to be
perceptive, as well as colorful. See Cross, 363 S.E.2d at
458-60. Justice Neely concludes that "Davis v. Fair is an
extremely formalistic opinion that strains at a gnat but
swallows a camel.H 363 S.E.2d at 458.
D. PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS
State divorce courts must always recognize the financial
benefit accompanying dependency exemptions when awarding
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alimony and child support. However, income tax exemptions are
only valuable to persons with income, and up to a certain
point# the higher the income the more valuable the financial
benefit/ given the progressivity of the federal income tax.
Cross, 363 S.E.2d at 460. Prohibiting state courts from
allocating the available exemptions to the parent receiving the
greatest economic benefit often results in the unnecessary
depletion of limited family resources.
Thus/ use of the power to order a custodial parent to
execute a section 152 declaration should not be used to evenly
or otherwise divide the available exemptions without regard to
the particular economic realities. On the contrary/ it should
be limited to those situations where the noncustodial parent
has the higher income and provides the majority of support for
the child or children whose exemption is claimed—support at a
level which can be increased as a result of a reduction in his
or her tax burdens. Indeed, it would be an abuse of discretion
for a divorce court to order a custodial parent to sign the
declaration in the absence of appropriately supported findings
to that effect or demonstrating other exceptional circumstances
making it in the best interest of the parties and their
children that the declarations be signed. The declarations are
not to be used as a kind of "consolation prize" for parents who
are losing daily association with their children. Moreover/ by
ordering the custodial parent to execute the declaration/ the
court actually gives the custodial parent a tool to compel
timely support payments. The court's order should provide that
the duty to execute the declaration at the end of each year is
contingent on the noncustodial parent being current in support
payments. See also note 4, supra. The custodial parent may
then rightfully refuse to execute the declaration if support
payments are owing, thereby creating an economic incentive for
the noncustodial parent to comply with his or her support
obligations.
As observed in Sarver, "[t]his is not a question . . . of
•overrid[ing] federal tax law* or 'unconstitutional meddling
with Congressional authority.' It is simply a matter of
determining and preserving the most resources in situations of
obvious limited resources." 439 N.W.2d at 554 (Sabers, J.,
specially concurring).
E. CONCLUSION
In summary, we conclude the 1984 amendment to section 152
does not divest state courts of their traditional power to
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allocate federal tax dependency exemptions/ and state courts
have the power to order a custodial parent to execute a
declaration in favor of the noncustodial parent. The contrary
position followed by only a minority of jurisdictions was not
intended by Congress, especially given the lack of an express
termination of the traditional approach of state courts to
dependency-exemption allocation. Finally, the practical effect
of a contrary ruling would essentially prevent state courts
from taking permissible advantage of progressive tax brackets
and maximizing the resources available to support divorcing
parents and their families. All of that having been said, the
power to order execution of a section 152 declaration should be
cautiously and prudently used, with the sole objective of
maximizing the financial resources available to the ••family"
unit.
The court in this case had the requisite judicial power to
direct plaintiff to execute the section 152 declaration for
defendants benefit as an aspect of its overall property
distribution. Whether or not that disposition was an
appropriate exercise of discretion need not be decided in view
of the extensive reassessment of property and support questions
which will occur on remand. In the process of that
reassessment, appropriate disposition of the tax exemptions,
and the question of any related orders concerning execution of
section 152 declarations, will depend on the economic realities
which emerge and must be in accordance with the views expressed
in this opinion.
The parties shall bear their own costs and attorney fees
incuri^jfi on anpfiaJ.

GregoTy K. Orme, Judge
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